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Abstract 
This essay examines the tensions between liberalism and capitalism through an analysis of Edmund Burke's 
works on eighteenth-century liberal political economy and, specifically, the challenges posed by colonial 
capitalism. When criticizing the East India Company, Burke attempted to fortify "commercial" principles, on 
which British self-image rested, against the "rapacious" policies of British imperialism in India, which 
threatened this liberal self-image. His denunciation of the Company thus can be construed as an index to 
broader contradictions between the liberal self-image of capitalism and the coercive processes of colonial 
displacement and extraction that were an integral part of capitalism's emergence. The article, in its conclusion, 
outlines some theoretical and methodological issues that arise from situating Burke's writings in their colonial 
and capitalist contexts. 
 
Society is indeed a contract ... but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a 
partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, callico or tobacco, or some other such low 
concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties ... 
it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, 
those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause 
in the great primeval contract of eternal society. 
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 
Thus Edmund Burke set the dichotomous terms of his criticism of the natural jurisprudential theories of social 
contract, the extremities of which, he thought, glared in revolutionary France and suffused the radical Lockean 
sermons of Dr. Richard Price at home. The antithesis between the venal, temporary contract in commodities on 
the one hand, and the great primeval contract between generations, on the other, has conventionally been 
interpreted as a classical expression of the conservative, traditionalist, and organicist moorings of Burke's 
social and political philosophy. The same antithesis has also been construed to mark Burke's anxieties over the 
disintegration of the inherited social relations under the mercurial pressures of the rising commercial-capitalist 
forces, embodied in the ascendancy of moneyed interests. What has drawn no attention, however, is the 
specificity of the commodities subject to this contract, which stands as the antithesis of Burke's "society" as 
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such: Pepper, coffee, callico, and tobacco. The crass and fleeting contract that Burke posited as the polar 
opposite and even the dissolution of the bonds constitutive of society was of a colonial-capitalist nature. 
This essay argues that the notion of colonial capitalism can shine new interpretive light on Burke's intellectual 
career. Although capitalism and colonialism are distinct historical and social phenomena, as I discuss below, 
there exist reasonable grounds to consider their historical entwinement and theoretical integration in a single, 
non-aggregative analytic field. In line with this composite interpretive framework, this article brings together 
two prominent axes of analysis in the extant Burke scholarship. The first of these examines Burke's political 
economic works as situated in the shifting economic relations in Britain. The second focuses on Burke's 
writings and speeches on the British Empire, and especially on India, as the hermeneutic key for broadly 
interpreting his political thought. 1Unfortunately, there has been little productive exchange between these 
scholarly approaches. Following Ann Stoler and Frederick Cooper's call to place the metropole and the colony 
in the same analytic field,2 this essay seeks to connect these two foci of analysis and read Burke's works on 
political economy and empire together. 
I argue that when viewed through the lens of colonial capitalism, one can discern in Burke's thought 
perspicacious expressions of the historical tension between the liberal self-image of capitalism and its violent 
colonial entanglements in the late eighteenth-century British Empire. Burke's rhetorical flourish on the 
vicissitudes of the British Empire and his vituperation of the East India Company's economic policies in India 
articulate intellectual aporias that follow from attempting to accommodate coercive processes of capital 
accumulation in the colonies within a liberal cast of contractual freedom, equality, and civilized manners of a 
commercial society, which defined the self-conceptions of the metropole. The threat posed to the liberal-
commercial self-image of Britain by the coercive processes of surplus extraction in India can offer a new 
perspective on the tensions and ambivalences in Burke's thought. These tensions and ambivalences have been 
the object of much debate and disagreement in Burke scholarship, which I discuss below around the two 
"Burke problems." 
I begin this article with an overview of the two Burke problems and some theoretical remarks on colonial 
capitalism as an interpretive framework. I then analyze Burke's "commercial ideal" and reconstruct from 
Burke's writings a vision of political and moral economy that endorsed the pursuit of material interest, an ethos 
of productivity, and self-regulating markets. Most importantly, Burke prescribed a wall of separation between 
political power and economic transactions, which sustained legal equality and contractual freedom that were 
indispensable for public utility and equity. While Burke sanctioned capital accumulation in the liberal, 
metropolitan self-image of commerce as a voluntary and mutually beneficial relation, this image was 
profoundly challenged by the colonial expropriation and exploitation of India. The third section constructs a 
detailed inventory of the colonial inversions of the commercial ideal. In the fourth and last section, I argue that 
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an attentive reading of Burke's indictment of the East India Company policies indicates that such inversions 
arose from tendencies inherent in the commercial ideal. Burke's attempt to salvage the liberality of commerce 
hinged on the containment of its colonial inflections, which threatened to disclose the unsettling propensities of 
self-interested exchange and the profit motive. Burke's inveterate denunciation of Company rule in India can 
be understood as an attempt to shore up the increasingly blurred distinctions between civilized commerce and 
unabashed plunder, between enlightened self-interest and unbridled rapacity, and between mercantile principle 
and political power. 3 Against this theoretical background, I review Burke's post-1780 works as articulating an 
attempt to come to grips with colonial capitalism of the late eighteenth century. I conclude by drawing out the 
broader theoretical and methodological implications of the analysis presented here for political theory and 
intellectual history in general. 
The Two Burke Problems and Colonial Capitalism as a Frame of Analysis 
There is a sizeable literature that examines Burke's forays into political economy, and another, equally 
sizeable, that explores his concerns with the problems and conundrums of empire. These two literatures 
provide us with two "Burke problems," which serve as a useful departure point for this essay. The first "Burke 
problem" has as its stake the economic position of the author, who once proclaimed that he has "made political 
oeconomy an object of my humble studies, from my very early youth to near the end of my service in 
parliament." 4 One prominent strand of interpretation in this field depicts Burke as a proponent of modern 
economic relations that had emerged in eighteenth-century England, and underscores his defense of the right to 
private property, pursuit of self-interest, and value of commerce. C.B. Macpherson provides the most assertive 
articulation of this position. Although not denying the conservatism of Burke's political thought, he maintains, 
"the market whose naturalness, necessity, and justice [Burke] was celebrating was specifically a capitalist 
one." 5 Macpherson's view of Burke finds resonance in unexpected quarters. J.G.A. Pocock, for example, who 
elsewhere criticizes Macpherson for causing "unnecessary trouble ... by telescoping 'possessive' with 
'accumulative,' and 'accumulative' with 'bourgeois,'" 6 designates Burke a proponent of the Whig aristocratic 
government, which was identified with "the growth of the commercial society."7 Jerry Muller, by no means 
sharing Macpherson's Marxian commitments, paints Burke as a life-long Smithian champion of "capitalist 
economic development" and "free trade," and an opponent of the Speenhamland system of wage 
regulations. 8 The latter point is endorsed by Gertrude Himmelfarb, for whom Burke's designation of labor as a 
commodity subject to the rules of commerce, and his austere stance on the "laboring poor" and poor relief, are 
indicators of his adherence to the principles of a competitive market economy. 9 Even P.J. Marshall, who 
stresses the Ciceronian pedigree of Burke's thought, remarks that Burke was "very much a man of his time in 
his conviction that trade between equals could only be beneficial to both sides."10 
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The commercial-capitalist image of Burke's economics is met with skepticism by those for whom the 
historically grounded, traditionalist parameters of Burke's intellectual world preclude commitment to modern 
market principles. This perspective is stressed by David Bromwich, who construes Burke's "attack on the 
psychology of commercial and scientific reason-giving" as an effort "to salvage the last of Britain's pre-
capitalist morality of governance." 11 Similar skepticism focuses on Burke's position on trade. For Ian 
Hampsher-Monk, Burke's well-known defense of the mercantilist Navigation Acts rests on "distinctly un-
Smithian and very Burkean" grounds of custom,12 and strictly follows the purpose of severing the crown's link 
to colonial revenue and maintaining its financial dependence on parliament.13 Donald Winch highlights the 
heterogeneity of Burke's economic thought, combining laissez-faire in the domestic labor market, 
unproductive consumption by the landed aristocracy, and governmental regulation of trade.14 
This interpretive spectrum also hosts a number of "ambivalent" Burkes. Isaac Kramnick's Burke is painfully 
stretched between the meritocratic values of the bourgeoisie (to which he belonged) and the prescriptive 
conventions of the aristocracy (whom he served). 15 Bernard Semmel tries to resolve the conflicting tendencies 
in Burke's economic thought by ascribing economic conservatism to "early Burke" and economic liberalism to 
"late Burke,"16 a positioning that Himmelfarb emphatically rejects. She, instead, posits the tension in Burke's 
thought as representative of "the paternalists of the 1840s who cherished traditional social order with equal 
zeal as they did individualistic competitive economy." 17 
The second Burke problem revolves around Burke's efforts to retain and reform the British Empire, an issue on 
which he claimed considerable knowledge and celebrated himself, "most for the importance; most for the 
labor; most for the judgment; most for constancy and perseverance in the pursuit." 18 Some scholars present 
Burke as a defender of empire, even though his reasons for such defense are weighed differently. Hampsher-
Monk delineates "custom and shared culture" as the basis for a "continued imperial link," which, however, 
extended only as far as the Atlantic settler colonies. 19 Marshall contends that Burke, especially when faced 
with the cultural alterity of the Indian dominions, invoked providence and an imperial duty to ensure the 
welfare of the imperial subjects: "a glowing vision of peoples, united through God's providence in a bond of 
protection and mutual benefit." 20 For Whelan, Burke conceived of empire as a vehicle of commercial grandeur 
and "progressive increase of improvement," especially in the New World.21 Daniel O'Neill concurs and argues 
that Burke saw the British Empire as the redeemer of African barbarism and American savagery.22 
Yet, Burke has also been hailed as a critic of empire. Uday Mehta and Jennifer Pitts, in an unexpected 
interpretive convergence, both maintain that Burke had an egalitarian appreciation of cultural pluralism, 
manifested most conspicuously in his sympathy for the Indian subjects under the rule of the East India 
Company. 23For Mehta, Burke's insistence on the contemporaneity of different experiences resisted 
metropolitan inclinations to map local difference onto temporal development and to authorize empire as the 
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agent of civilization.24 In Pitts's account, Burke challenged exclusion and domination based on cultural and 
racial difference within the empire, and assailed the moral insularity of the British and their haughty disdain 
for the "barbarous Indian" through strategies of familiarization. 25 O'Neill opposes such ascriptions of 
cosmopolitanism by tracing Burke's defense of the Indian society to the existence of an established aristocracy 
and institutionalized religion within it, which elicited the sympathy that Burke denied the natives of America 
and Africa. 26 
However, even Burke's purported anti-imperialist dispositions, and especially his efforts to impeach Warren 
Hastings, have been construed as serving the imperial cause. For Sara Suleri, the impeachment staged a 
spectacle of the "anxieties of empire," where Burke, an ambivalent accomplice in the colonial project, 
protected British colonialism "from being indicted for the larger ill of which Hastings was simply a 
herald." 27 Nicholas Dirks sharpens Suleri's claim and dubs Burke the "founding" figure of British imperialism 
for displacing the "scandal" from an inevitable element of empire to a mere "impediment" to good colonial 
government, and for reclaiming empire as a "sacred responsibility" imbued with a moral mandate. 28 
Each of these interpretive controversies suffers from a basic theoretical shortcoming. The debate on Burke's 
political economic orientation, while valuable for its attention to the materiality of the social relations of 
reproduction, remains within the confines of what Manu Goswami has aptly labeled "methodological 
nationalism." 29 It focuses on Britain when explaining the development of commercial-capitalist forces and 
consigns Britain's colonial possessions to an auxiliary status, as the passive recipient of capitalist relations that 
originated in England and were diffused to the rest of the world. The debate on Burke's position on empire, 
indebted to insights generated by postcolonial studies, has the merit of underscoring the constitutive role of the 
colonies in the fashioning of metropolitan self-conceptions. However, the heavy culturalist orientation at best 
underplays the economic calculations and incentives that played a crucial part in imperial expansion, 30 and at 
worst leaves one with the impression that the British colonial enterprise was mainly ignited by the imperialist 
thrust inherent in liberal universals. As a result, Burke's economic and imperial works are often treated as 
addressing mutually indifferent questions. 
An alternative perspective could be formulated by conceiving of the British imperial formation as the unit 
within which to consider the formation of commercial-capitalist relations,31 and the metropole-colony nexus as 
where the problems of political economy and metropolitan self-conception intersect. More specifically, I 
propose to analyze metropolitan political economic principles and their liberal values as integral to the self-
image of Britain as "Protestant, commercial, maritime and free." 32 To this end, I argue that Burke subscribed to 
a liberal self-image of Britain predicated on contractual freedom and equality under the rule of law, which was 
being tested by the imperial political economy of India, conceptualized here as "colonial capitalism." This 
reading offers a new perspective on the two Burke problems by compelling us to think them together. 
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I understand the term colonial capitalism to describe the formative impact of colonial expansion on the 
development of global networks of capital accumulation. The networks are comprised of a heterogeneous array 
of relations of production and social control, most importantly, forms of unfree labor and unequal exchange. In 
a recent essay, Pitts includes among the "the British Empire's systemic injuries" "massive resource extraction, 
establishment of catastrophic systems of bonded labor, deindustrialization, entrenchment of 'traditional' 
structures of authority, and insertion of subsistence farmers into often wildly unstable global market 
systems." 33 India's integration to global capital networks under the British rule involved the deindustrialization 
and "peasantization" of the Indian textile sector combined with the commercialization of agriculture, especially 
after the Permanent Settlement of 1793. 34 While the dominant organization of production remained ostensibly 
non-capitalist, by the end of the eighteenth century peasant-based Indian agriculture had been enmeshed in the 
circuits of British and more broadly European capital. Indian peasants and agricultural laborers, working 
predominantly in the cultivation of cash crops like indigo, were bonded by forms of debt-peonage and forced 
to generate a surplus for the East India Company, landlords, financiers, and agricultural entrepreneurs, in the 
form of tax, rent, and interest. 35 Systemic exploitation of the peasantry primarily through non-market means, 
investment of agricultural tax revenues in financing exports to Europe and China, and the East India 
Company's manipulation of regional rivalries to expropriate local princes, coalesced into a process of "colonial 
primitive accumulation"--that is, extracting surplus from the subcontinent by means of legal and political force 
and absorbing it into global movement of capital, the epicenter of which was shifting to Great Britain. 36 The 
marked illiberality of this process when judged by the bar of contractual freedom and legal equality--or put 
differently, the incompatibility between the colonial manifestations of capitalism in India and its liberal self-
image embodied in ideals of British commercial society--offers us a vantage point for reconsidering Burke's 
critique of Hastings, and his effort to reform the Indian administration. 
Burke's Commercial Ideal 
The conviction that free pursuit of material interest, combined with a productive ethic of labor, would 
simultaneously improve personal fortunes and contribute to the overall wealth of society was a staple 
assumption of eighteenth-century liberal political economic thought. 37 This premise appeared in Burke's 
economic remarks as early as his Tracts on Popery Laws (1765) and persisted until his last 
publications, Letters on a Regicide Peace (1797). Lambasting the restrictive economic policies of anti-Popery 
Laws in Ireland, Burke extolled the "desire of acquisition" as "always a passion of long views; confine a man 
to a momentary possession, and you at once cut off that laudable avarice which every wise state cherished as 
one of its first principles." Curtailing that laudable avarice by profit ceilings and short tenure terms in landed 
property resulted only in "famishing the present hour and squandering all upon prospect and futurity" and 
promoted a "thoughtless, loitering, and dissipated life." 38 Three decades later, Burke revisited the "desire of 
acquisition," this time to defend moneyed property that floated the national debt during the Anglo-French War. 
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This desire represented a principle without which the means of their service to the state could not exist. The 
love of lucre, though sometimes carried to a ridiculous, sometimes to a vicious excess, is the grand cause of 
prosperity to all states. In this natural, this reasonable, this powerful, this prolifick principle ... it is for the 
statesmen to employ it as it finds it ... he is to make use of the general energies of nature, to take them as he 
finds them. 39 
This assertion of self-interest as a natural, reasonable, powerful, and prolific principle and the source of 
accumulation of national wealth stripped it of its Aristotelian odium, pace the classical interpreters of Burke's 
political economy. In his 1780 "Speech on Economic Reform," aimed at improving the administrative structure 
of the British government, Burke boasted that his economic proposals were rooted not in "airy speculation" but 
"in real life, and in real human nature ... in the business and bosoms of men." 40 Properly managed, the desire to 
accumulate lodged in men's bosoms could be a universally beneficent force, and it was incumbent upon the 
prudent politician to channel the desire towards, as Smith put it, "universal opulence."41 
The self-interest that Burke accepted and praised was not the destructive urge derided by the classical Christian 
tradition. It was akin to Adam Smith's "desire of bettering our condition, a desire which, though generally calm 
and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave." 42That is to 
say, Burke's notion was already inflected by the transformation of destructive passions into the constant and 
predictable motive of accumulation, insightfully elaborated by Albert Hirschman.43 For Burke, as opposed to 
Smith and other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, this transformation was indebted less to doux commerce than 
to the civilized manners fostered by Christianity and social prescription. These manners had over time 
attenuated the conquering spirit of arrogant nobility that characterized the ancient Britons.44 Thus rendered 
calm and dispassionate, self-interest implied two conditions: first, that the self-interested subject behave in a 
rational, settled, and most importantly, accumulative and future-oriented manner; second, following from the 
first, that labor and consumption be concentrated primarily, though not exclusively, in productive 
activities. 45 The first of these conditions had its antithesis in the "thoughtless, loitering, and dissipated life" in 
Ireland, while the second condition was contravened by the unproductive consumption that sustained the 
"unprofitable titles" of the royal household, which Burke targeted in his economic reform proposals. 46 Even 
Burke's cherished nobility had to compensate for their "luxury and even their ease" by paying "contribution to 
the public; not because they are vicious principles, but because they are unproductive."47 Despite these fiscal 
considerations, Burke ascribed to "unproductive" classes of nobility and clergy a crucial socio-political role in 
making possible the commercial domain in which productive consumption was to rule, a point I discuss below. 
While security of property formed the backbone of the Whig worldview in general, Burke's thoughts on 
property articulated a particular socioeconomic vision, complete with assumptions and prescriptions about how 
the material and moral benefit of property could be maximized. It can be plausibly argued that Burke favored a 
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capitalist form of private property--that is, large-scale enterprises worked primarily by wage-laborers. Burke 
not only extolled the private possession of land as a factor of production, but he also argued for as much 
concentration of capital as possible. He unequivocally expressed this position in his posthumously 
published Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, which was originally crafted in 1795 as a memorandum to the 
Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger. Designed to intervene in the parliamentary debates on high corn 
prices, minimum wage legislation, and amendment of the Elizabethan Poor Laws, the Scarcity essay comprises 
the clearest expressions of Burke's views on economic matters. Burke writes, "monopoly of authority ... is an 
evil; but the monopoly of capital is the contrary. It is a great benefit, and a benefit particularly to the 
poor."48 The overall reasoning behind this endorsement was the familiar Smithian concatenation of the 
accumulation of stock, division of labor, increased productivity, expedited accumulation, universal opulence, 
and improved condition of the laboring population. Large-scale capitalist enterprises would enable their 
proprietors to keep afloat and invest at lower rates of annual profit, thereby providing sustained employment 
for laborers. 49 
While Burke composed the Scarcity essay late in his life, one can also catch early and unexpected glimpses of 
its capitalist market principles in his "Speech on Economic Reform." This speech represented a chapter in 
Burke's (and more broadly Rockingham Whigs') ardent struggle against court influence. The objective was to 
preserve the independence of parliament by reducing the perceived political sway of the crown. 50 The 
economic considerations that structured Burke's reform proposals were certainly strategic. However, 
perceiving them in the light of the other essays considered here suggests that they cannot be reduced to their 
immediate context, but instead belong to a wider terrain of economic thinking. Burke's proposed methods for 
curbing royal patronage and political corruption included the sale of crown and forest lands on the grounds that 
such dispersed possessions "are of a nature more proper for private management, than public 
administration." 51 This call for the privatization of public lands becomes more intelligible if one bears in mind 
that Burke's political career coincided with the period of parliamentary enclosures, which spanned roughly the 
century between 1750 and 1850 and consolidated large tracts of private property. One can conjecture that 
Burke favored the enclosure process, given that he perceived in the enclosure of crown lands the same 
principles "upon which you have acted in private inclosures. I shall never quit precedents where I find them 
applicable." 52 Public lands thus sold were to be cheap enough to leave the purchasers with adequate "capital" 
for cultivating them. The principal revenue to be obtained from "these uncultivated wastes" would accrue not 
from the sales but from the "improvement and population of the kingdom," which required that the 
"unprofitable landed estates of the crown" be disposed of and "thrown into the mass of private property." 53 
Capitalist private property is incomplete without a labor force to work on it, and one finds strong assumptions 
and normative prescriptions of wage-labor in Burke's later writings. In the Third Letter on a Regicide Peace, 
Burke described the laboring classes of Britain as people who had nothing but their labor power to sell: "As to 
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the common people, their stock is in their persons and in their earnings" and they were to be paid "according to 
the operation of general capital." 54Again, in the Scarcity essay, the labor power of the common people was 
referred to as "a commodity, like every other," "an article of trade ... subject to all the laws and principles of 
trade."55 Burke's uncompromising commodity view of labor was compounded by his aloofness on the 
precariousness of the laborers' condition. Wages were determined not by the "necessity of the vender, but [by] 
the necessity of the purchaser," and whether one could obtain subsistence wages on the market was "totally 
beside the question in this way of viewing it." 56 Intervening in the wage-contract was a direct and, in 
government's hands, an "arbitrary tax" that encroached upon property. Minimum wage or outdoor relief 
amounted to "trifling with the condition of mankind" and pushed "those who must labour or the world cannot 
exist" to "seek resources ... in something else other than their own industry, frugality, and sobriety." 57 Burke 
was similarly unequivocal on the topic of capital accumulation. Capital accrued from the surplus value 
generated by the industrious and sober wage-laborer: "the labour, so far as that labour is concerned, shall be 
sufficient to pay the employer a profit on his capital." 58 As Macpherson has noted, this relation of surplus 
transfer was couched in the language of a "natural and just" chain of subordination, with enterprising capitalist-
farmers at the top, descending to agricultural laborers, beasts of burden, and inanimate instruments. 59 The 
theological bent in Burke's view of the socioeconomic hierarchy, while setting it apart from Smith's more 
secular vision, in effect captured the social relations characteristic of eighteenth-century agrarian capitalism, 
especially in southern England--namely, the triad of capitalist landlord, improving tenant, and wage 
laborer. 60 And, unlike Smith's political economy, Burke's religious language imbued economic inequality and 
distress with a fatalism that would be matched only by Thomas Malthus's theory of population.61 
The other major pillar of Burke's commercial ideal was the justice of the free market. For Burke, the 
foundations of good government and just laws resided in equity and "general and publick utility."62 Left to its 
own operations, the market not only maximized public utility but also ensured that the transactions were 
equitable. Burke emphatically asserted in the Scarcity essay that the "market alone can settle the price" and 
does so with an astonishing "truth, correctness, celerity, and general equity." His belief in the natural tendency 
of markets to convert self-interested behavior into societal prosperity went beyond Smith's metaphorical 
invisible hand and bordered on the providential maxim that "the benign and wise disposer of all things ... 
obliges men, whether they will or not, in pursuing their own selfish interests, to connect the general good with 
their own individual success." 63 
The equity principle manifested itself first and foremost in contractual freedom based on the "great rule of 
equality" in commercial transactions.64 This principle, which constituted the essence of the moral superiority of 
the free market over other forms of productive organization, was nowhere more explicitly stated than in 
the Scarcity essay. There, Burke expressed his preference "to leave all dealing, in which there is no force or 
fraud, collusion or combination, entirely to the persons mutually concerned in the matter contracted for." He 
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reasoned that the contracting parties knew their interests and their particular circumstances better than any 
third party, and predicated the equity and therefore the validity of the contract exclusively on the volition of the 
contractors. If the parties were not "completely [masters of the intercourse], they are not free, and therefore 
their contracts are void." With each party looking to "all possible profit, which, without force or fraud, he can 
make," the contract implied compromise and identity of interest. Most crucially, in labor contracts "it is 
absolutely impossible that their free contracts can be onerous to either party." 65 While Burke had misgivings 
about political theories of social contract, he was convinced that legal freedom and equality, and the 
categorical exclusion of deception and coercion, rendered economic contract a fair and morally elevated form 
of organizing material production and distribution. The complexity of Burke's philosophical principles and 
difficulty of interpolating them notwithstanding, his economic principles evinced overwhelmingly liberal 
attributes. 
The providential aura with which Burke consecrated the market became even more salient when he later 
defended the "laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God" against the 
improvident hands of government.66 Laissez-faire assumptions informed Burke's vision of Britain as a 
commercial society. He was critical of government intervention in the market as detrimental to "general 
equity" insofar as it violated contractual freedom. "The moment that government appears at market, all 
principles of market will be subverted," and a "monopoly of authority" will emerge under the "appearance of a 
monopoly of capital." The economic role that Burke reserved for government conformed to a textbook 
description of laissez-faire. While government could "prevent much evil, it can to very little positive good"; 
"the office of the judge cannot dictate the contract. It is his business to see that it be enforced." There could be 
"no authority on earth" to "judge what profit and advantage ought to be." 67 Instead, the "the truly and properly 
public" function of the state was to maintain public peace, order, and safety: "Let Government protect and 
encourage industry, repress violence and discountenance fraud, it is all they have to do."68Commercial affairs 
constituted a "department of things [that] manners alone can regulate. To these, great politicians may give a 
leaning, but they cannot give a law."69 
The most important premise in Burke's laissez-faire prescriptions was to keep the market devoid of political 
power. In order for the efficiency and justice of the market to unfold, commerce and sovereignty, economy and 
politics had to remain strictly compartmentalized. This is not to suggest that political power was irrelevant to 
commerce. On the contrary, it fulfilled a fundamental role in establishing and maintaining the conditions under 
which the moral and political economy of commerce could survive and flourish. As seminally argued by 
Pocock and expanded upon by others, Burke embraced the Scottish Enlightenment conception of "commercial 
society" in a very unorthodox manner. He subscribed to commercial society as a socio-historical category that 
encompassed a specific set of social, political, economic, and moral characteristics that placed it at the 
terminus of the known historical development of human communities. He parted ways with the Scottish 
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philosophers, however, on the direction of the causal chain. Whereas Adam Smith, William Robertson, John 
Millar, and Adam Ferguson looked first and foremost to the commercial mode of subsistence to extrapolate 
polished manners and civil institutions, Burke prioritized the attenuating impact of organized religion and 
prescriptive hierarchy on manners. 70 The relations characteristic of commerce could take hold only after a 
certain level of social stability, discipline, and refinement was achieved through the exercise of power relayed 
by these emphatically non-economic institutions. This extra-economic element of power, which for Burke laid 
down the conditions of a complex modern economy, has been referred to as the "noncontractual basis of 
commercial society." 71 Yet given Burke's as well as the Scottish philosophers' discrediting of social contract 
theories, a more apt designation would be the "noncommercial basis of commercial society." This non-
commercial element marked the stakes of the specific relation between political power and commerce, and it is 
not coincidental that "force and fraud," the two virulent pathogens of commerce, frequently recurred in Burke's 
political economic writings. As long as government remained in its proper place, that is, in the margins of the 
economy, political power constrained force and fraud. If it penetrated the economy, political power became the 
instrument of force and fraud. Political power ought to form a shell that protected and ordered, through 
property rights and contract enforcement, the field of commercial transaction, and should not bleed into that 
field. Precisely because it was the non-commercial condition of commerce, political power had to remain non-
commercial. 
In addition to the politico-legal medium, this constitutive non-commercial element surfaced in Burke's 
aesthetic appreciation of clergy and nobility, classes deemed to be economically unproductive and retrograde 
by Scottish political economists like Smith and Hume. 72 Established church and aristocracy, respectively 
embodying the "sublime" and the "beautiful," fulfilled the essential role of inculcating in the populace the 
social discipline essential for the peaceful acquiescence of the lower orders to being governed by their betters. 
These institutions inspired sentiments of fear and love that bound the "common people" to their station in life 
with volition and contentment. These sentiments formed a subtle yet strong fabric of "manners" that supported 
commercial relations. 73 For Burke, the object lesson in the constitutive link--between, on the one hand, social 
discipline and order undergirded by organized religion and social hierarchy, and on the other, a complex and 
prosperous commercial economy--was supplied by the French Revolution. The evisceration of French nobility 
and clergy was not only an appalling moral offence but also a tremendous economic catastrophe because it 
effectively undermined the "protecting principles" of "commerce, trade, and manufacture." Confiscation of 
church lands for backing up the new currency ( assignats) epitomized the fatal shortsightedness. Confiscation, 
which ironically was pursued to promote commerce, destroyed the non-commercial basis of French commerce, 
and left in its wake a pack of "gross, stupid, ferocious, and at the same time, poor and sordid barbarians." 74 
The next section, through a survey of Burke's reports and speeches on India, will demonstrate that each and 
every one of the principles of this commercial ideal, or as Burke put it, "every just principle of commerce," 
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was breached by the British rule on the subcontinent. 75 Given that the commercial ideal was the primary prism 
through which Burke viewed and judged the British image, his fourteen-year labors to reform the Indian 
administration can be read as a desperate attempt to shore up the frayed contours of the commercial ideal, and 
reinstate the boundaries between commerce and political power, economy and sovereignty, public and private. 
The East India Company's "merchant-sovereignty," which Burke came to despise, represented the most 
offensive fusion of political power and commercial interest, and inevitably bred colonial violence and an 
economy of plunder. A related source of vexation for Burke was that the violators of the commercial principles 
in India had "come from a learned and enlightened part of Europe, in the most enlightened period of its time ... 
from the bosom of a free Country." 76 On the colonial frontiers of British capitalism, civilized Britons rapidly 
jettisoned the manners and laws of commercial society, and turned into barbarous frontiersmen. Most 
importantly, a careful analysis of the specific terms in which Burke condemned the East India Company's 
exploits suggests that the source of effrontery to the commercial ideal was not a pre-commercial atavistic 
residue or the moral lapse of a few wayward individuals, but the very core of the commercial ideal itself. The 
natural desire to accumulate that animated the whole commercial society and powered the "great wheel of 
circulation" was the main source of the havoc in India. In the colonies, the truth of commerce showed itself to 
be piracy; the underside of self-interest was rapacity; and the arrival of civilization heralded barbarity. 
Colonial Inversions 
It would be fair to say that Burke did not hold grave concerns regarding the British ventures in India prior to 
his service on the Commons' Select Committee on East Indian Affair between 1781 and 1783. In 1781, his 
"Speech on State of East India Company" defended the chartered rights of the East India Company against the 
encroachments of the parliament and the crown, and invoked the status of the Company charter as private 
property held sacred by historical prescription under the law of England. That year, Burke also proposed the 
Bengal Judicature Bill, which shielded the East India Company from governmental interference by curtailing 
the powers of the Supreme Court of Bengal. After two years of examining privileged information on Indian 
affairs, Burke had dramatically changed his position. In 1783, he spearheaded Fox's India Bill, which, if signed 
into law, would separate the political and commercial activities of the East India Company and place each 
function under parliamentary supervision. He justified governmental intrusion into the Company charter by 
recourse to the "universal laws of morality" that determined the legitimacy of all chartered rights. 
Burke's defense of Fox's India Bill expressed two major worries he had developed about the East India 
Company's rule on the subcontinent. First, Burke worried about the destructive impact of British economic 
policies, manifested in the 1769-1770 Bengal famine. Second, he expressed grave concern about the corruption 
of British politics by "Indianism," a term Burke used to denote a political "cabal" formed by the Company 
servants in India; the Court of Proprietors and the Court of Directors in London; and, most worrisome of all, a 
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growing number of members of parliament who owed their seats to the money and influence of the Company. 
Indianism crystallized in the figure of the "nabob," or the Company agent returning to Britain with corrupt 
Eastern riches, such as Paul Benfield who had made his fortune partially in Madras by funding local wars 
through usurious loans. The "Indian interest," which expressed an amalgamation of political power and 
economic gain, profoundly unsettled Burke and inspired his colonial reform efforts to the point of obsession. 
These efforts reached spectacular proportions in 1786, when he proposed the impeachment of Warren 
Hastings, the Governor General of Bengal (1773-1784). Burke's speeches and writings between 1783 and 
1797, especially his "Speech on the Fox's India Bill" (1783), the Ninth Report of the Select Committee (1783), 
"Speech on the Nawab of Arcot's Debts" (1785), and "Speech on Opening of Impeachment" (1788), offer an 
inventory of political corruption, economic misconduct, and moral degeneracy he perceived in the Indian 
government. 
While the vagaries of British rule over a vast and culturally alien population might have remained the classical 
problem of a "free though conquering people,"77 the issue was complicated by the fact that the agent of British 
rule was a mercantile company whose raison d'etre in India was material gain. The East India Company's 
newly acquired political power inflected its pursuit of commercial interests by opening up non-market 
opportunities for profit. As Burke put it, the East India Company's "despotism" in India was not only 
"oppressive, irregular, capricious, unsteady," but more importantly "rapacious and peculating." 78 Putting power 
to profit rode roughshod over the commercial principles of property, legal equality, contractual freedom, and 
mutual benefit, and thus undermined the foundations of a prosperous and just society in India. From 1783 
onwards, Burke systematically declaimed the East India Company policies, and provided his audience with 
detailed accounts of the colonial plunder that they supported. 
Burke's admonition of the Indian government in the Ninth Report of the Select Committee, the most 
comprehensive tract Burke ever wrote on the political economy of the Indian dominions, strongly suggests that 
he envisioned the commercial ideal as a normative grid that ought to have applied not just in Britain but in 
India as well.79 The "Mainspring of the Commercial Machine, the Principles of Profit and Loss" were to 
govern all economic dealings in India. When the nawab (Mughal magistrate) of Bengal abolished all duties in 
a move to undercut the British abuse of trading privileges, Burke applauded the measure as a "forcible, simple 
and equitable" retaliation against the "oppressions of the monopoly." Furthermore, he extolled the virtues of 
"rivalship" to redeem and reinvigorate the Indian manufactures, a notion that would later reappear as "market 
of competition" in the Scarcity essay. Finally, inveighing against opium and salt monopolies, Burke declared 
the "unerring standard of the public [open, free, competitive] market" as the rule for Bengali economy.80 
Burke therefore appears to have viewed the British Empire, complete with its settler colonies and 
dependencies, as the space in which "laws of commerce" should apply. The aegis of the 
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British imperium would provide the political framework for the rule of law securing contractual freedom and 
equality in commercial transactions. Social and political heterogeneities notwithstanding, the British Empire 
constituted an economically homogenous space in which the property and contracts of British subjects could 
be secured. Burke's was a vision of "imperial commerce." 81 
Commerce in India, however, was "imperious commerce." The East India Company, both institutionally 
through the Council of Bengal and individually through its servants, deployed sovereign prerogative for 
material aggrandizement. The immediate effect was the abrogation of juridical equality in commercial 
transactions between the East India Company agents and the local merchants and producers. The British, who 
had been trading in India since the early-seventeenth century, always tried to wrest privileges and avoid duties 
in Bengal. However, until the middle of the eighteenth century, they had been compelled to run commercial 
transactions under the nominal authority of the Mughal emperor and the effectual jurisdiction of the 
nawab. 82 After a string of military victories, beginning with Plassey in 1756 and culminating in de facto rule in 
Bengal in 1765, the status of the British changed. While the East India Company retained the nominal 
sovereignty of the Mughal emperor and the nawab, it effectively governed the province through its 
stranglehold on the revenue system. Burke was not convinced by this strategy: "the English are now a people 
who appear in India as a conquering nation" and any commercial dealing with them was a "dealing 
with power."83One of the first things the Company did with its newfound power was to eliminate all native 
intermediaries between the manufacturers and itself. The removal rendered the Company's agents "magistrates 
in the Markets in which they dealt as traders" and the legal asymmetry invariably entailed the oppression and 
dispossession of the natives and paved a road to "forced and exorbitant gains of a trade carried on by power." 84 
The natural correlate of the new legal inequality was the evaporation of contractual freedom, whereby coercion 
and extortion replaced volition, compromise, and mutual benefit overseen by an impartial judge. Under the 
East India Company's rule, forms of bonded labor proliferated. Burke scornfully observed that the elimination 
of local middlemen and the "advances system" (whereby Indian producers were forced to accept credit in 
advance and mortgage their future labor, products, and even instruments of labor) reduced the Indian weavers 
to "virtual vassalage" under a "most violent and arbitrary power," and instituted "debt peonage." A public and 
competitive market in credit, which could have freed the Indian producers from "debt bondage," was 
deliberately thwarted by East India Company policies. Adding insult to injury, laborers "defrauded" into debt 
bondage would be "delivered over like Cattle in Succession to different Masters, who, under Pretence of 
buying up the Balances due to their preceding employers, find Means of keeping them in perpetual Slavery." 
Those who managed to avoid debt bondage found that they had no control over how they invested their stock. 
The monopoly powers of the Company in cash crops, especially opium, were used to force farmers to cultivate 
these crops instead of grain, even after the dearth and high costs of foodstuffs led to the 1769-1770 famine that 
decimated the population of Bengal. 85 
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Subversion of contractual freedom was compounded by the insecurity of property, which manifested itself in 
confiscations at all levels of the social hierarchy. Expropriation of the Indian nobility by the British was most 
dramatically described in Burke's "Speech on Almas Ali Khan" (1784), which accused the Company of having 
invented "the crime of having money ... like the sin against the Holy Ghost in Christianity." 86 In this scheme, 
which Burke detailed in the Eleventh Report of the Select Committee , wealthy Indian nobles were first accused 
of treason on fabricated and expedient grounds, and then were punished by confiscation, which sometimes was 
accompanied by death. While the state's confiscation of property was an anathema to Burke's Whig 
sensibilities, its occurrence under the pretext of a legal trial ("the great criminal has the law in his hand") was a 
macabre travesty of justice, more execrable than the use of open, sheer force. Placing law in the service of 
plunder brought a disgrace upon the British nation, which Burke thought to "have better institutions for the 
preservations of the rights of men than any other Country in the World." 87 Predation on property also struck 
Indian farmers and artisans, who were first indebted by the arbitrary pricing of the Company, and then were 
visited by Company agents who acted in the capacity of lenders of usurious loans, assessors of the accruing 
debts, and ultimately bailiffs seizing the debtors' property. 88 Finally, the lowest strata of Indian society, 
the ryots who worked the land of zamindars, were "ruined and made desperate" by extortionate taxes, not only 
on land (twice the rate in England), but also on such necessaries of life like salt under the British 
monopoly.89 The situation is starkly put in the "Speech on the Nabob of Arcot's Debts," which concerned the 
dispute between the Nawab of the Carnatic and his British creditors: Every man of rank and landed fortune 
being long since extinguished, the remaining miserable last cultivator, ... after having his back scored by the 
farmer, has it again flayed by the whip of the assignee, and is thus by a ravenous, because a short-lived 
succession of claimants, lashed from oppressor to oppressor, whilst a single drop of blood is left as the means 
of extorting a single grain of corn. 
These were the "most miserable men," whose "blood withheld from their veins and whipped out of their backs" 
provided the "extortion, usury and peculation" on which the creditors and debtors fed.90 
The aggregate effect of the political economy of plunder in India breached the mutual benefit principle of the 
commercial ideal. Commerce, conducted under the rule of a power that was itself a party in economic 
transactions, became a zero-sum game, whereby the enrichment of the British meant the impoverishment of 
Indians. Unlike the Muslim conquerors before them, the British did not take responsibility for the dominions 
they conquered. Instead, driven by an "insatiable lust for plunder," the British carried away whatever they 
found available. Burke made the point in his "Speech on Fox's India Bill," his first parliamentary initiative to 
reform the Indian administration under the Fox-North coalition: The difference in favor of the first conquerors 
is this; the Asiatic conquerors very soon abated of their ferocity, because they made the conquered country 
their own. They rose or fell with the rise or fall of the territory they lived in. ... But under the English 
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government the order is reversed. The Tartar invasion was mischievous, but it is our protection that destroys 
India. It was their enmity, but it is our friendship. 
Under the pretext of patronage and alliance, the East India Company had devised fraudulent methods of co-
opting, indebting, and impoverishing local rulers and their dominions.91 Indian riches thus obtained were 
siphoned out of the realm, making "the transport of its plunder ... the only traffic of the country."92 After 
detailing the "deep, silent flow of wealth from the Carnatic," which he estimated to be 20 million pounds 
between 1760 and 1780, Burke asked rhetorically, "what are the articles of commerce or the branches of 
manufacture which these gentlemen have carried thence to enrich India?" 93 These and other surveys of the 
systematic drain of wealth, or "the plunder of the East," prompted Burke to conclude emphatically, 
"commerce, which enriches every other country in the world, was bringing Bengal to total ruin."94 
The fusion of political power and commerce reached its apex in the "revenue investment" system of the 
Company, which Burke painstakingly detailed in the Ninth Report. After the Company obtained the revenue 
rights (diwan) of Bengal by the Treaty of Allahabad in 1765, it began to finance its Indian exports by the taxes 
it levied in that province. This constituted a "new system of trade, carried on through the medium of power and 
public revenue," which Burke contended was "not commerce" but "annual plunder," or "tribute" disguised as 
"investment." Insofar as it was driven by narrow and immediate monetary concerns, the revenue-investment 
system obscured the principle that the welfare of the natives and thus good governance were essential for the 
investment of capital, for sustained profits, and for steady tax revenue. Therefore, the "vast extraction of 
wealth" from India was maintained not, as it ought to have been, by the "improvement" of the country but by 
raising the land rents and annulling the payments due to local powers, and was backed in the last instance by 
the military force of the Company. Even more outrageously, despite its intensive pillage of the Indian wealth, 
the East India Company constantly teetered on the verge of bankruptcy. Mismanagement of Company funds 
and private embezzlement drained the coffers, and the Company had to be bailed out by the British 
government on more than one occasion. The system of revenue investment had become a vehicle for remitting 
private fortunes to England at the expense of both British and Indian publics, vindicating Burke's conviction 
that there could not be public utility where there was no equity.95 "It is there the public is robbed," Burke 
declared, "in its army, in its civil administration, in its credit, in its investment which forms the commercial 
connection between that country and Europe."96 
Perhaps most troubling of all, violations of the free market, legal equality, and free labor were not occasional; 
their subversion was "regular, permanent, and systematical." Such violations could not be attributed to the 
aberrant corruption of a few servants. Instead, they flowed from the degeneracy of the state itself: "the hand of 
government, which ought never to appear but to protect, is felt as the instrument in every act of 
oppression." 97 The Indian administration represented a complete inversion of the functions that Burke ascribed 
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to government in commercial society. Instead of protecting property, it confiscated; instead of enforcing 
contracts, it dictated; instead of promoting the welfare of the population, it impoverished and depopulated. 
Moreover, while the East India Company was not a proper government, it was not a proper mercantile body 
either, because, having usurped sovereign power, it had abandoned commercial principles. It was indifferent to 
the prices paid on the open market; it engaged in systematic breach of contracts; it had poor and fraudulent 
accounting, bringing upon it insolvency, improvident borrowing, and ruined credit. In short, "no trace of 
equitable government is to be found in their politics; not one trace of commercial principle in their mercantile 
dealings." 98 
Burke parted ways with Smith on the problem of colonies, despite their shared vexation with mercantile 
sovereignty and their broad affinity on matters of domestic political economy. Smith derived his liberal 
approach to colonial questions from abstract principle, which placed him among the more unequivocal critics 
of empire. His ideal solution to what he perceived to be a colossal waste of resources and distorted economic 
development in the old "colonial system" was radical decolonization and free trade between independent 
states. Seeing the naïve implausibility of such a call, he proposed the (equally unrealistic) option of an imperial 
federation of free trade, whose seat of government would shift around the empire in accordance with the fiscal 
contribution of each province. 99The contrast that Smith drew between the ideal of free trade and peaceful 
commerce and the mercantile regulations of his time was itself an abstract construct, derived from his critique 
of the extant overseas trading practices that invariably wedded military force to commercial enterprise. 100 
Burke stood closer to a different vision of global politics, which deemed the Navigation Laws to be the 
cornerstone of colonial policy, and which embraced empire for economic reasons that were more pressing for a 
statesman like Burke than for a philosopher like Smith. The alacrity with which Burke incorporated the Indian 
dominions into the British Empire 101 should be sought as much in reasons of imperial political economy as in 
the better-known providentialist and constitutionalist justifications.102 As early as 1775, he alerted his 
parliamentary audience to the meteoric rise of the Atlantic colonial commerce and its centrality to British 
prosperity. Similarly, he introduced Indian dominions to the House as "[t]he greatest body of your revenue, 
your most numerous armies, your most important commerce, the richest source of your public credit," and 
underscored the "interest which this nation [Britain] has in the commerce and revenues of that 
country." 103 Unlike Smith, Burke leaned towards the mercantilist principles of promoting free 
trade within imperial borders and fostering "plenty" as the "sinews of power." These principles had become 
political common sense by the end of the eighteenth century.104 
As Marshall notes, The deepening commitment to empire by British government was driven above all by a 
sense of insecurity. Insecurity was rooted in fear of France ... Empire played a very important part in this long 
confrontation with France. The long-distance trades, predominantly carried on within a framework of imperial 
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regulation, were thought to generate the maritime resources and a crucial part of the wealth that enabled 
Britain to hold her own. 105 
Given the perceived indispensability of empire for national survival, prosperity, and reputation, it comes as no 
surprise that Burke spurned Josiah Tucker's calls for decolonization as childish and repudiated Smith's 
criticism that colonial trade "has drawn the juices from the rest of the body." 106 Burke's skepticism of global 
free trade was not exceptional. Patrick O'Brien reminds us that very few critics of mercantilism and 
Imperialism writing between 1688 and 1815 developed an alternative blueprint for national development. ... 
Nearly everyone at the time perceived that economic progress, national security, and the integration of the 
kingdom might well come from sustained levels of investment in global commerce, naval power, and, 
whenever necessary, the acquisition of bases and territories overseas. 107 
Accordingly, Burke's remedy for mercantile sovereignty eschewed decolonization and called for the 
institutional improvement of the Indian administration in the spirit of bureaucratic professionalism and probity, 
foreshadowing the reforms enacted by the Cornwallis government after Pitt's 1784 India Bill. 
Dialectics of Commerce 
The Company, this sovereign-mercantile manticore, strayed from Burke's commercial ideal not only in terms 
of economic policy but also in moral values of civilization. It might at first appear strange to see Burke 
referring to the British exploits in India as "barbarous," given his sense of Britain as "the most enlightened of 
the enlightened part of Europe." 108 Nonetheless, the frequency with which the term appeared in Burke's 
discourse indicates that its use was not accidental. In his "Speech on Almas Ali Khan," Burke referred to 
Indians as "millions of our fellow-creatures ... whom our barbarous policy had ruined," and he poured scorn 
on the Company agents' actions as barbarities of an "inhuman system."109 Two years later, he once again 
assailed Hastings's policies as "crimes of barbarity."110Considered in terms of the Scottish Enlightenment 
categories that influenced Burke's thought, British behavior in India represented a civilizational regress from 
the civility of commercial society to the barbarism of nomadic societies.111 This relapse found expression in 
Burke's indignation at the youth of most of the East India Company servants, who neither had the chance to 
grow roots in Britain, nor had the intention to do so in India, in effect rendering them vagrant marauders, 
"birds of passage and prey" who descended in waves upon that hapless country. 112 
On the frontiers of the empire, British men acted like roving frontiersmen, a term that can be applied with 
theoretical force to the British imperial formation more generally. Burke himself had evoked a similar imagery 
in his "Speech on Conciliation" (1775), delivered at the height of the political crisis with the Thirteen Colonies. 
Opposing proposals for restricting further English settlement in North America, he warned the House of 
Commons that the colonists would ultimately defy the limits and settle beyond the Appalachians, but in the 
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process "they would change the manners with the habits of their life; would soon forget a government by 
which they were disowned; would become Hordes of English Tartars; and, pouring down upon your 
unfortified frontiers a fierce and irresistible cavalry, become masters of your Governors and 
Counsellors." 113 Polished manners would fall from Englishmen as they left the institutional order and civilizing 
influence of Christianity and social hierarchy. While in America this civilizational distance would issue from 
the settlement of the outback, in India it would result from the remoteness of the country from the British 
metropole, a problem that Burke mentioned repeatedly. To continue the analogy, survival in an alien natural 
environment in North America would force the Englishmen to lose the refined manners of civilized life and 
become the "rugged frontiersmen" that James Fenimore Cooper would portray in the Leatherstocking novels. 
Similarly, the alien cultural environment in India would instill anxiety, fear, and revulsion in Englishmen, 
driving them to isolate themselves from Indians, develop harder and sterner attitudes, and lose all possibility of 
sympathy with those people whom they ruled and oppressed.114 
Taken together, these remarks on the American and Indian empires indicate that for Burke the imperial frontier 
was a dangerous space, where gentlemen turned into frontiersmen, civility degenerated into barbarism, 
polished manners dissipated in the violent grab for land and riches. 115 The problem, however, was that the 
British Empire that Burke embraced could expand by no other means than the exploits of the frontiersmen in 
America and India. The colonial frontier, with its attendant moral abominations from a metropolitan 
perspective, was not an anomaly. It was the very modus operandi of imperial expansion that underpinned 
British power and prosperity.116 Thanks to the unruly colonists in America, the slave raiders in Africa, the 
planters in the West Indies, and the Company men in India, the fruits of colonial primitive accumulation 
poured into Britain and made the "gentlemanly capitalism" of the metropole possible. 117 Per Burke's 
suggestion, Britain could have re-established a "truly commercial" relation to India but only at the cost of a 
massive negative balance of trade. This had been the case until the East India Company (as "providence" 
would have it) reversed the balance of trade by deploying extra-economic violence and violating the "just 
principles of commerce." 118 
Most importantly, the Company's barbarity was neither that of the marauding Tartars or Goths (who were 
common paradigms of barbarism in Burke's day) nor that of the rude and warlike ancient citizens, as Pocock 
and Richard Bourke argue.119 The barbarism of the Company lurked within the commercial society itself. The 
barbarism that erupted in India was not a relapse into the "conquering spirit of arrogant nobility," which had 
been tamed by religion and prescription. It was a new kind of barbarism fueled by the natural "desire of 
acquisition," by the principle of self-interest that was supposed to be "calm and dispassionate," and by that 
"reasonable, powerful, and prolifick principle" of "laudable avarice" that was the "grand cause of prosperity." 
In the colonies, these economic motivations and moral principles turned into their opposites. The desire of 
acquisition turned into "peculation"; calm and dispassionate self-interest turned into violent "rapacity"; 
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laudable avarice turned into "sordid avarice"; and the prosperity they ought to have created turned into 
"ruination" and "depopulation." Carefully selecting his terms, Burke systematically condemned the East India 
Company on economic as well as moral grounds. On the imperial frontier in India, Englishmen did not turn 
into Tartars; they became banians. 
Banians were the native servants of Englishmen in India, who also acted as commercial agents on behalf of 
their masters. Burke's opinion of banians bordered on loathing. In his "Speech on Fox's India Bill," he 
described banians as creatures " whose fathers they [Indian nobility] would not have set with the dogs of their 
flock."120 During the impeachment, he warned the House that if Indianism were suffered to dominate British 
politics, the British nation would "become a Chain of Twisters, prevaricators, dissemblers, Liars, a nation 
of Banians."121 Banians were "habituated to misery and subjection, can submit to any orders, and are fit for the 
basest services. Having been themselves subject to oppression ... they are fit to oppress others." In the service 
of Englishmen "the Banyan extorts, robs, and murders." 122 The idea of the banian embodied for Burke the 
sacrifice of morality at the altar of self-interest, the reduction of all social relations to temporary association for 
pecuniary aggrandizement, the dissolution of human sociability as such in the ether of vulgar material gain. 
This dynamic was represented, first, in the collusion of the Nawab of Arcot with Benfield and his "cabal of 
creditors," which ended up ruining the inhabitants of the Carnatic. Burke denounced this collusion as a 
"magnificent plan of universal plunder" and labeled the creditors "the determined enemies of human 
intercourse itself."123 The second incarnation of the social dissolution was the "system of banyans" in Bengal in 
general, and Hastings's relation to his banian in particular. In this system, money was the only interracial glue 
that bound people who otherwise had not, and would probably never have, an iota of human sociability 
between them. In other words, the banian embodied the dark underside of the very principles of self-interest 
and contractual freedom. These principles reached their extreme form in the colonies, whereby they turned into 
their opposites and became the solvents of society as such. 
The "banian" embodied the odium of Indianism in the colony; the "nabob" condensed it in the metropole. 
Burke's speeches after 1783 variously express the fear that the peculation and avarice born of colonial 
capitalism would come home to roost. In his speech on Fox's India Bill, Burke depicted the returned Company 
servants "loaded with odium and with riches" as a pestilence that infiltrated the body politic of the English 
elite: "they marry into your families; they enter into your senate; they ease your estates by loans; they raise 
their value by their demand." 124 The note of urgency in these words would reach a crescendo in Burke's speech 
on the Sixth Article of Impeachment: "These people pour in upon us everyday. They not only bring with them 
the wealth they have, but they bring with them into our country the vices by which they were acquired." New 
barbarians awaited at the gates to "let loose all the corrupt wealth of India acquired by the oppression of that 
country to the corruption of all liberties ... today the Commons of Great Britain prosecute the delinquents of 
India. Tomorrow, the delinquents of India will be the Commons of Great Britain." 125 
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As the frontispiece quotation that opens this essay implies, it was not capitalism (men of mobile wealth, 
moneyed interest, public credit) but colonial capitalism(imperial frontiersmen, unabashed plunder, violence, 
and oppression) that Burke found threatening. In the colonies, commercial society revealed its other, violent, 
non-commercial underside. An indirect triangulation of the "dialectics of commerce," and a window onto the 
vicissitudes of colonial capitalism, is thus part of the heritage that Burke has bequeathed to political theory. 
Conclusion 
This article has focused on one aspect of Burke's economic and imperial ruminations, namely, the inversion in 
India of Burke's commercial ideal. His efforts to reform the Indian government indicate his belief that 
"imperial commerce" (as opposed to "imperious commerce") was possible under the British rule of 
law. 126Whether this was indeed the case is a question of historical research and theorization that exceeds the 
scope of this essay.127 This essay, instead, has illustrated how colonial capitalism as an analytic frame can shed 
new light on the tensions and ambiguities in Burke's thought, and thus enhance existing Burke scholarship. A 
colonial perspective shows that Burke's intricate understanding of political economy is woven from 
sociological theories of historical development and institutional evolution, psychological and aesthetic 
ruminations, and moral and political philosophy. In Capital, Karl Marx labeled Burke a "vulgar bourgeois 
through and through."128 As the foregoing discussion has established, if Burke's understanding of political 
economy exhibited "bourgeois" colors, these were much more complex and variegated than Marx granted. 
The analysis in this article opens new lines of inquiry for intellectual history and political theory. For example, 
why did Burke shower sympathy on the Indians while evincing little compassion for African slaves and open 
disdain for Native Americans? O'Neill hypothesizes that India qualified as a "civilization" on a par with Britain 
mainly because of its institutionalized religion and established aristocracy. In light of this article, one could 
proceed further and explore the place of socioeconomic complexity in the vexed relationship between reason 
and civilization in Burke's thought. After all, the signature characteristic of "commercial society" was its 
unprecedented economic complexity, "interest, habit, and the tacit convention that arise from a thousand 
nameless circumstances."129 Such complexity denied the possibility of a panoptic and omniscient perspective 
from which commercial society could be grasped and rendered it almost a sublime totality. Hampsher-Monk 
captures this problem well when he argues that for Burke "political society" was a "miraculous" assemblage of 
institutions, rules, moral beliefs, customs, habits, and dispositions. 130 Systemic harmony in a social formation 
of such magnitude and intricacy could not possibly be the result of deliberate design. This leads Bromwich to 
conclude that for Burke "society" was a "work of art without a maker."131 Burke's remarks on India, especially 
in his "Speech on Fox's India Bill," suggest that he perceived India as a commercial society in the Scottish 
Enlightenment sense of the term. This is corroborated by the affinity between Burke's and William Robertson's 
views of Indian society. 132 One, therefore, might explore a revisionist thesis: it was not reason per se that 
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Burke wanted to humble before tradition and custom, and to admonish in India as well as in France. He wanted 
to cast aspersions on abstract reason's hubristic dream of regulating or revolutionizing the awe-inspiring 
complexity of a modern commercial society. His insistence on humility evaporated when the object of reason 
was the socioeconomic simplicity of either savage societies in America or barbarous societies in Africa. 133 
A second question involves the historical origins of property and order in Burke's thought. As scholars have 
noted, Burke admitted that all political order originated from conquest, and that expropriation was the fount of 
all property.134 Legitimacy accrued to power and property with time and through prescription. Still, these 
origins were not to be readily exposed at times of discontent. In his "Speech on Opening of Impeachment," 
Burke declared, "there is a secret veil to be drawn over the origins of all governments"--a point that would 
recur in his celebration of the parliament of 1688, which "threw a well-wrought veil over every circumstance 
tending to weaken the rights [of the king to the throne], which ... they meant to perpetuate." 135 Whelan 
contends that imperious British rule in India threatened to unveil the violent and irregular origins of 
government both in India and in Britain.136 Conceptualizing colonial India as a mirror to the violent origins of 
English political and economic order promises insights into questions about founding violence and criminal 
violence, about constitutive power and rule of law, and about legality and legitimacy in Burke's thought. One 
comes across glimmers of these questions in Burke's diatribe against Hastings. Burke labeled Hastings as "the 
great criminal [who] has the law in his hands," compared him to the inmates of the Newgate Gaol, apologized 
to the latter for "dishonoring" them with "such an odious comparison" (a point echoed in his characterization 
of the principles behind the French Revolution as too "scandalous" and "shocking" even for the criminals in 
Newgate), and insisted that Hastings be tried at the bar of "natural, immutable and substantial justice" rather 
than by the British common law. 137David Armitage has argued that imagining the "Second [that is, Eastern] 
British Empire" as an empire of conquest has served to efface the initial phase of conquest and empire-building 
in the British Isles.138 A careful analysis of Burke's anxieties over the Second British Empire could help retrace 
such effacements. 
Finally, the movement between political theory and intellectual history in this article can serve as an invitation 
to construct syncretic interdisciplinary frameworks when tackling profound historical and theoretical concepts, 
such as liberalism, capitalism, and colonialism. This seems especially important today, when students of 
intellectual history, political economy, and post-colonial literary criticism are seeking both to escape 
disciplinary confinement, and to discover spaces in which they can share the insights that their intellectual 
traditions generate. 
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